$100,743,642 is a floor — not a ceiling

Every figure in this damages claim is calculated on Aegon's own declared data because Aegon refuses to produce actual bordereaux. When actual data is produced, all figures will be recalculated — and will be higher.

S0-06 — The Central Question Full document in bundle — S0-06

The figures on this page derive from one unanswered question: what reinsurance premiums did the Defendants actually receive? The Defendants have admitted the data exists and was not provided to the commission calculation function. No explanation has been provided. These figures are calculated on Aegon’s own declared data — they are a floor. On production of actual bordereaux, all figures will be recalculated upward.

The core position

The floor characterisation refers to the data source — Aegon's own declared (and understated) figures rather than actual bordereaux. The refusal to produce actual bordereaux is the sole reason a floor methodology is required. If Aegon had complied with its disclosure obligations, the figures would be calculated on actual data and would be higher. The three corrections applied within that data are contractually required — they are not discretionary modelling choices.

The proof chain

1

Aegon held the actual premium data throughout

Actual monthly GWP bordereaux for Korea (LG Insurance), Japan (Mitsui Sumitomo, Aioi), and Australia (St George, Lumley, CBA, Hallmark) have been held by Aegon since at least 1 July 2005, confirmed by Aegon's own payment records and the Lumley Ingenium system.

Source: CC-15, D3.70, Ingenium system
2

Aegon admits it has the data

On 2 August 2024 (D3.70), Aegon made a written admission that actual premiums "were available but not shared with the commission payment team." This was not extracted under compulsion. Aegon knew it had the data — and knew it was not using it.

Source: D3.70 / CC-15 — 2 August 2024 — certainty: 99.9%
3

Aegon was formally required to produce it — and refused

Written requests were made from 2021. A formal Clause 6.7 invocation was made in 2024, imposing a contractual obligation to produce the data. Aegon has formally refused. The SOC seeks a production order requiring delivery of all actual bordereaux within 28 days of judgment.

Source: Clause 6.7 invocation 2024; 04-01 SOC Part S, Order 5
4

Declared figures are therefore the only available data source

The methodology uses Aegon's own declared GWP figures because Aegon refuses to produce actuals. The three corrections are contractually required. The result is the minimum underpayment on Aegon's own data. It is a floor by definition.

Source: S7-01 methodology; S7-06 floor analysis

The D3.70 admission — 2 August 2024

The most significant single document in the damages case. On 2 August 2024 an Aegon representative made a written admission that eliminates Aegon's only available defence to the floor characterisation.

"Actual premiums were available at the Reinsurer level but were not shared with the commission payment team."
CC-15 / D3.70 — Aegon written correspondence — 2 August 2024 — evidential certainty: 99.9%

Eight constraints suppressing the floor below true entitlement

Every constraint is confirmed and intentional. Each suppresses the stated quantum below true entitlement. Removal of any one on production of actual data increases the claim.

Aegon's declared GWP only

All GWP figures are Aegon's own declared estimates. Actual bordereaux will be higher.

Effect: suppresses premium base

No GWP growth factors

Twenty years of portfolio growth (2005–2025) entirely excluded. No inflation or CPI adjustment.

Effect: ignores real expansion

No new product commissions

New insurance products introduced post-2005 excluded entirely, even where covered by the same reinsurance agreements.

Effect: excludes additional revenue

Korea Component B excluded

Differential between declared and actual Korea GWP entirely excluded — reserved pending production order.

Effect: Korea claim understated

Simple interest only

Interest on s.100 simple basis. Equitable compound interest reserved and would produce a substantially higher figure over 20 years.

Effect: significant understatement

Two-thirds run-off factor (CA)

Conservative two-thirds factor applied to CA base throughout. Actual run-off may be lower, increasing CA principal.

Effect: CA principal understated

CC-13 pivot date (July 2005)

Claim commences 1 July 2005. Any pre-July 2005 underpayments excluded consistent with the pleaded start date.

Effect: pre-2005 period excluded

Post-demand interest excluded

Interest from 25 November 2025 to judgment not included in the stated floor. It continues to accrue daily.

Effect: floor is a past-dated snapshot

The legal framework

What Aegon holds and refuses to produce

TerritoryData held by AegonConfirmationImpact if produced
KoreaActual monthly GWP bordereaux from LG Insurance from 1 July 2005CC-15 confirms access throughoutKorea Component B — uplift beyond ~$16,504,603
JapanActual monthly GWP from Mitsui Sumitomo and Aioi from 1 July 2005Aegon payment records confirm internal calculationsJapan EA and CA principal uplift
St George / LumleyActual monthly GWP from 1 July 2005Australian regulatory filings; Ingenium dataSt George and Lumley EA and CA uplift
CBAActual monthly CBA GWP from 1 July 2005CBA-TIMAP arrangement recordsCBA EA and CA uplift beyond ~$3,003,991
HallmarkActual monthly GWP for Hallmark AD and Term productsADMS table confirms CA scopeHallmark CA uplift for AD (82.5%) and Term (76.5%)
Source documents
Two Series 7 documents underlie the floor page. S7-06 is the complete evidentiary analysis of why the figures are floors; S7-01 Part 6 introduces the floor methodology in plain terms.
S7-06 · Production Order & Quantum Floor
Why the figures are floors — full analysis
  • Part 1 — Why figures are floors, not ceilingsThe eight conservative constraints; distinction between floor (data source) and correction (contractually required)
  • Part 2 — What Aegon holds and refuses to produceTerritory-by-territory table of withheld data; CC-15 and D3.70 as confirmation
  • Part 3 — Production order sought04-01 SOC Part S, Order 5 — full text of the relief sought; 28-day production timeline
  • Part 4 — What recalculation will addTerritory-by-territory analysis of uplift expected on actual bordereaux
  • Part 5 — Jones v Dunkel adverse inferenceDoctrine applied to Aegon's refusal; written requests from 2021; Clause 6.7 invocation
  • Part 6 — Chaplin v Hicks: defendant-created uncertaintyFull legal analysis; conservative floor as the court-accepted substitute for withheld actuals
  • Part 7 — Forensic accountantExpert evidence required to verify recalculation on actual bordereaux
S7-01 · Introduction & Context
The floor methodology introduced
  • Part 1 — The one questionWhy the case resolves to a single factual question: how much premium did Aegon actually receive?
  • Part 6 — Floor figures, methodology and production ordersPlain-language introduction to the floor concept; why $100,743,642 understates the true entitlement
S7-10 · Probability-Aligned Damages Basis
Juridical framework for the damages claim
  • Part 1 — The claim in summaryWhy the entitlement is effectively determined rather than merely probable under the juridical probability framework
  • Part 2 — Pathway exhaustion analysisEvery legally permissible pathway to a different outcome identified, tested, and defeated
  • Part 3 — The floor as legal minimumWhy $100,743,642 represents the minimum legally coherent outcome — not one possible outcome among many